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A question has come up in a local criminal case which has doubtless
been passed upon by the various district courts, but oddly enough has
never been before our state Supreme Court. We believe that a discussion
of the question will be of interest to the members of the bar.
The question is: Can one who obtains a loan of money by false
representations as to his financial responsibility be prosecuted under Sec-
tion 305 of our Criminal Code? Section 305 reads in part as follows:
"Obtaining goods under false pretenses-Penalty.-If any
person or persons shall knowingly and designedly, by any false
pretense or pretenses, obtain from any other person or persons any
chose in action, money, goods, wares, chattels, effects or other valu-
able thing whatsoever, with intent to cheat or defraud any such
person or persons of the same, every person so offending shall be
deemed a cheat, and upon conviction, shall, where the property
obtained is over the value of twenty dollars, be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not to exceed ten years; * * *"
If this section could be read alone, the answer to our question would
be simple indeed, for the language of the section is broad enough to in-
clude the fraud of obtaining money on credit, but in Colorado we have
in our Criminal Code another section in point, Section 3 16, to-wit:
"False pretenses of character or responsibility in writing-
Penalty.-If any person, by false representation in writing of his
own responsibility, wealth or mercantile correspondence and con-
nection, shall obtain a credit thereby, defraud any person or persons
of money, goods, chattels or any valuable thing, or if any person
shall cause or procure others to teport falsely of his honesty, wealth
or mercantile character, and by thus imposing on any person or
persons, obtain credit, arid thereby fraudulently get into possession
of goods, wares, merchandise or any valuable thing, every such
offender shall be deemed a swindler, and on conviction shall be
sentenced to return the property so fraudulently obtained, if it can
be done, and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and
imprisoned in the county jail n~t exceeding six months."
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Both of the quoted sections have been Colorado law since the earli-
est days.
Is obtaining a loan of money "obtaining credit" under Section
316? The courts have uniformly held that it is. (24 A. L. R. 400,
citing many cases.) If then, such an offense can be prosecuted under
Section 316, our next question is: Must it be? Since there is a special
statute relating to obtaining credit under false pretenses, does the general
false pretenses statute become inapplicable? In at least two jurisdictions
where there are statutes like ours this precise point has been ruled upon.
(Lucas v. Illinois, 75 Ill. App. 662; Commonwealth v. Boyd, 181 Ky.
382, 205 S. W. 390.)
In the Illinois case one Lucas borrowed $100 from one Metcalf as
the result of Lucas' false oral representation that he was a man of certain
wealth. The lower court overruled a motion to quash the indictment,
but the appeal court reversed the ruling, saying in part:
"As we view it, the proper construction to place upon the two
sections is that section 96 [like our Sec. 305] was intended to in-
clude cases where the defrauded party parted with his money in
some other sense than as a loan, and that where the loan was pro-
cured by the false representation of the borrower as to his solvency,
the case falls within section 97 [like our Sec. 3161 provided the
representation was in writing, of course."
Since the representation was oral, the case fell under neither Section 96
nor Section 97 and the court ruled that the motion to quash the indict-
ment should have been sustained,
In the Kentucky case, under identical facts and similar statutes, the
appeal court sustained the lower court's quashing of the indictment, say-
ing in part:
"The latter section [like our Sec. 3161 'doubtless was dic-
tated by the knowledge that criminal charges of false pretenses are
often instituted in reality tw compel the payment of debt and are
easily fabricated.' "
The holdings in these cases are apparently in accord with recognized
principles of statutory construction:
59 Corpus Juris 1056: "(d) General and Specific Statutes.
Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and
comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same
subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect
to a consistent legislative policy * * *. It is a fundamental rule
that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the
same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special
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act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether
it was passed before or after such general enactment * * *."
An early Illinois case well illustrates these principles of statutory
construction. In this case (114 Ill. 320, 2 N. E. 55) the court was
asked to determine whether the word "whoever" in a general larceny
statute was broad enough to include "constables." Reading this statute
by itself, the answer wtuld clearly be "yes." But since there was a
special statute governing larceny by constables, the court said "no":
"It is true that the word 'whoever' * * * has a broad or com-
prehensive meaning; but at the same time it is unreasonable to be-
lieve that the legislature intended that a constable should be prose-
cuted under both sections of the statute."
In passing a special act the minds of the legislators were necessarily
directed to the details of the special case and it is not probable that they
should intend by a general act to derogate from that special intention.
If one obtaining credit by false pretenses can be prosecuted under Section
305, then Section 3 16 loses its meaning, both as a statute designed to
prevent fabricated cases by requiring the false representations to be in
writing, and as one designed to mark the offense of obtaining credit by
false pretenses as less serious, because of the well-recognized human fail-
ing to puff and overstate one's financial position when he is in desperite
circumstances and in need of a loan, often without real criminal intent.
There is but one fly in the ointment.
Prior to 1891, the latter part of Sectiono305 included a concluding
sentence which was omitted in the amended statute of that year. This
sentence read: "This section shall not apply to sales of property on
credit." The change of the statute in 1891 was primarily for the pur-
pose of increasing the penalty for the offense of false pretenses. Why
was the quoted sentence omitted? It would seem that the omission,
instead of repealing Section 3 1 6 (general statutes do not repeal special
statutes by implication-86 Colo. 249), was either inadvertent, or in-
tended to delete unnecessary language. The Kentuky statute referred
to has no sich statement expressly limiting its scope, nor under the prin-
ciples discussed heretofore would such an express limitation be necessary.
In any event it is hiard to believe that the legislature intended to
greatly increase the penalty under Section 305 (one year minimum to
ten years maximum) and at the same time put within the scope of that
section for the first time cases of obtaining credit through false pretenses,
when custom and justice dictate both a lighter penalty and stricter proof
(characteristics of Sec. 31.6) than for the ordinary case of false pretenses.
However, the law is uncertain and should be clarified by legislative
enactment or a Supreme Court decision.
